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Changing Local Government Responses
to Migration in South Africa
Loren B. Landau
Veränderte Reaktionen von Kommunalverwaltungen auf Migration in Südafrika
Constitutionally empowered to be a leading force for development, provincial and municipal
authorities have been wary of addressing population movements or seeing them as fundamen-
tally tied to socio-economic development. In many instances, authorities fear that developing
pro-active, positive responses to migration would only encourage more of it. Whatever the
reason, budgeting and planning exercises make little reference to extended population projec-
tions or other insights into the relationships among mobility, livelihoods, and community devel-
opment. As the population continues to move, the shortcomings of these planning exercises and
interventions have become increasingly evident in terms of limited access to critical services,
physical and economic insecurity, marginalisation, and social conflict. This essay explains why
and suggests means of addressing these challenges.
With 2 Figures and 5 Tables
1.  Introduction
South Africa’s politics, economy, and society
have been shaped by elaborate controls on human
mobility and efforts to undermine them. With the
country’s first democratic elections in 1994, the
country’s once forbidden cities became primary
destinations for migrants from around the coun-
try, across the continent, and beyond. Population
movements – some predictable, some spontane-
ous; some voluntary, some forced – are now per-
ennial features of South African cities, towns, and
agricultural and mining communities (South Af-
rican Cities Network 2004: 36; Balbo and Mar-
coni 2005; Bekker 2002; Dorrington 2005).
Constitutionally empowered to be a leading
force for development, provincial and munic-
ipal authorities have nevertheless been wary of
addressing population movements or to link
214                                                Loren B. Landau                                  DIE ERDE
human mobility with. This reluctance partial-
ly stems from many policy makers’ belief that
immigration and migration are exclusively
matters of national policy concern. Others
unrealistically hope that mobility is merely a
temporary outgrowth of the country’s demo-
cratic transition. In many instances, authorities
fear that developing pro-active, positive re-
sponses to migration will only encourage
more of it. For these and other reasons, budg-
eting and planning exercises have been con-
ducted with little reference to extended pop-
ulation projections or other insights into the
relationships among mobility, livelihoods and
community development. As the population
continues to move, the shortcomings of these
planning exercises and interventions have be-
come increasingly evident in terms of limited
access to critical services, physical and eco-
nomic insecurity, marginalisation and social
conflict. This article reviews these challenges
and concludes with five recommendations for
improving migration policy and management.
2.  Data and Approach
In moving beyond the demographic and quantitative
fixations characterising much of the migration and
development literature, this study embeds demo-
graphic trends within broader socio-political and
institutional configurations. In doing so, it draws on
an ecumenical set of data to illustrate the intersec-
tions between human mobility and development in
South Africa. This includes participant observation
in national, local and regional migration-related
discussions, original survey research, quantitative
data analysis, and formal and informal interviews
with migrants, service providers, advocates and
local and national government representatives in
Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and elsewhere.
In all instances, it works from the position that
social and political understandings of human
mobility are as important as actual movements in
determining development outcomes.
For its quantitative components, this paper relies
on data provided by the national statistics agency
Residential site Migration history 
Sample 
N % 
Alexandra 
Born in South 
Africa 
Long-term residents 385 38 
Internal migrants  326 32 
Foreign-born 277 28 
Unspecified 18 2 
Total 1006 100 
Central 
Johannesburg 
Born in South 
Africa 
Long term residents 160 16 
Internal migrants  310 30 
Foreign-born 546 53 
Unspecified 6 1 
Total 1022 100 
Total 2028 - 
 
Tab. 1 2009 survey sample breakdown by place of residence and migration history
Umfang der Befragung 2009 nach Wohnort der Migranten und Migrationsgeschichte
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erations were conducted in Maputo, Lubumbashi
and Nairobi in 2006. The second survey (2009)
was conducted in Alexandra township just north of
Johannesburg and, again, in the inner city. A break-
down of the sample is included in Table 1.
The questionnaire covered a wide range of var-
iables, including individual and household live-
lihood strategies, migration experiences, social
and economic relationships and interactions
with formal and informal institutions. The data
the surveys generated are by no means repre-
sentative of South Africa’s ‘migrant stock’ or of
the general population. Nonetheless, they pro-
vide critical illustrations of trends and points
where migration and development intersect.
(Stats SA) – particularly the 2001 census and the
2007 community survey – and data collected by
colleagues at the African Centre for Migration &
Society (ACMS). The first of the ACMS surveys
(2006) interviewed 847 respondents in seven
central Johannesburg neighbourhoods. Of these,
29.9 % (253) were from the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (DRC); 24 % (203) from Mozam-
bique; 22 % (186) from Somalia; and 22.4 %
from South Africa (190) (the remaining 1.8 %
were from other countries mistakenly included
in the sample). The sample was 59.7 % male, gen-
erally reflecting official estimates of the inner-
cities demographic composition (South African
Cities Network 2006). An earlier iteration of this
survey was conducted in 2003 and additional it-
Fig. 1 Recent international migration to South Africa: Share of migrants in the total population by districts,
2001  /  Jüngere Zuwanderung nach Südafrika: Anteil der Migranten an der Gesamtbevölke-
rung in den Distrikten 2001
> 1 %
0.1 % – 0.2 %
0.2 % – 0.5 %
0.5 % – 1%
 > 0.1 %
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3. Demographic Overviews
In previous decades, much of South Africa’s inter-
national migration concentrated in agricultural and
mining areas. Similarly, until the late 1980s, urban-
isation was strictly regulated although never abso-
lutely controlled (see Posel 1997). Since the ear-
ly 1990s, both international and domestic migrants
are increasingly concentrated in the country’s ur-
ban centres (see Figs. 1 and  2 and Tab. 2). In 2001,
Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) estimated that
57.1 % of the population was urbanised. Based on
population densities, this number could be recal-
culated to 68.5 % or higher. Accompanying the
growth of South Africa’s urban population, the
Fig. 2 Domestic migration in South Africa: Share of domestic migrants in the total population, by districts,
2001 (Source: Stats SA)  /  Binnenwanderung in Südafrika: Anteil der Binnenwanderer an der
Gesamtbevölkerung in den Distrikten 2001
> 30 %
10-20 %
5-10 %
20-30 %
<   5 %
average household size has dropped from 4.5 in
1996 to 3.9 in 2001 (StatsSA Data). At current
rates of population movements, these trends are
likely to continue in the decades ahead.
As the figures and table above suggest, Gauteng
Province is at the centre of both international and
domestic migration. This is no surprise: while the
smallest of South Africa’s nine provinces in spa-
tial terms (< 2 % of national landmass), it contrib-
utes close to 34 % of the country’s gross domes-
tic product and almost 10 % of sub-Saharan Afri-
ca’s GDP. By far the most urbanised, it is also the
most diverse and cosmopolitan province. In the
2007 Community Survey, 5.6 % of the province’s
2012/3             Changing Local Government Responses to Migration in South Africa              217
Tab. 2 Domestic migrants in South African provinces by province of origin in %, in the years 2001-2007
Binnenwanderer in die südafrikanischen Provinzen, nach Herkunftsprovinz in % (2001-2007)
Destination 
province 
Share of migrants by province of origin (%) All provinces 
of origin WC EC NC FS KZN NW GP MP LP 
Western Cape 
(WC) 
± 54 5 3 7 1 25 2 3 100 (N=197,212) 
Eastern Cape 
(EC) 
29 ± 5 8 19 2 31 3 3 100 (N=85,392) 
Northern Cape 
(NC) 
20 6 ± 10 3 43 17 1 1 100 (N=46,054) 
Free State 
(FS) 
6 18 10 ± 8 14 34 4 4 100 (N=67,832) 
KwaZulu-Natal 
(KZN) 
6 45 2 4 ± 3 29 8 3 100 (N=124,276) 
Northwest 
(NW) 
3 16 4 15 4 ± 40 6 12 100 (N=152,933) 
Gauteng 
(GP) 
6 11 2 7 17 16 ± 15 27 100 (N=609,169) 
Mpumalanga 
(MP) 
2 7 1 6 13 5 27 ± 39 100 (N=128,903) 
Limpopo 
(LP) 
3 5 1 5 3 11 45 26 ± 100 (N=71,269) 
 Source: Stats SA
population was born outside South Africa, almost
double the national average. While international
migrants are a significant presence, they are only
about 15 % of the net migration of 418,000 be-
tween October 2001 and February 2007. Even
within the province, non-nationals are concentrat-
ed in certain cities (7.9 % of Johannesburg is
foreign-born) and particular neighbourhoods.
Even if international migration attracts the most
attention and opprobrium, domestic mobility is
far more significant in numeric terms. In the
absence of a full review, I wish to draw attention
to a number of critical points. First, research
(e.g., South African Cities Network 2006: 16)
clearly illustrates the spatial dynamics of migra-
tion to particular urban centres. In Metsweding,
a smaller municipality in Gauteng Province,
more than 10 % of the total population has re-
cently moved there. In Durban, the figure is less
than 1 %. While discussions of urbanisation typ-
ically focus on primary cities, the fastest grow-
ing parts of Gauteng are not Johannesburg and
Pretoria but rather smaller communities beyond
the ‘urban edge’ (see Tab. 3). The most notable
and controversial effect of this growth has been
the expansion of poorly serviced informal settle-
ments (i.e., shantytowns) ringing more estab-
lished and well-serviced formal settlements.
As a result of these are internal movements, out-
migration is also significantly shifting popula-
tion profiles of a number of the country’s small-
er and less prosperous communities. For exam-
ple, Chris Hani municipality in the Eastern Cape
has lost more than 8.5 % of its population over
the past decade (South African Cities Network
2006: 18). Many of those who leave are young
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men heading for the Western Cape, distorting
population profiles (Dorrington 2005; Collin-
son et al. 2006). More than sheer numbers, these
moves result in significant changes in skills level
and social composition. In the Western Cape, the
arrival of people from the Eastern Cape, tradi-
tionally an ANC stronghold, is not only trans-
forming the province’s racial composition, but
also challenges the province’s ruling party, the
Democratic Alliance. In Gauteng, the enormous
diversity fostered by migration has proven to be
a politically exploitable resource in the past,
particularly during the violence preceding the
1994 general elections and again in the May
2008 ‘xenophobic’ attacks (which targeted both
foreign and South African migrants). As South
African politics again become more competi-
tive, there are hints that ethnicity may re-emerge
as a dangerous political divide.
South Africa is also seeing a great diversifica-
tion in its population’s migration trajectories.
Whereas Apartheid-era South African migration
policy promoted permanent White immigration and
temporary Black migration, the post-apartheid pe-
riod is characterised by a mix of circular, permanent
and transit migration. Indeed, such impermanence is
encouraged by the current policy frameworks, the
difficulties migrants have in accessing secure ac-
commodation and the rapid rate of deportations.
The tendency towards transit is particularly vis-
ible in smaller towns where people first come
after leaving ‘rural’ or formal homeland areas
(i.e., former ‘native reserves’). Such smaller
towns are often unable to retain more ambitious
people who may quickly move on to larger cit-
ies or to smaller towns on the edge of larger cit-
ies. Coupled with these moves towards the larg-
Municipality 
In-migration as 
percentage of total 
population (2006) 
Metsweding (Gauteng) 10.13 
Overberg (KwaZulu-Natal) 8.18 
Tshwane (Pretoria) 7.15 
West Coast (Western Cape) 6.71 
Ekurhuleni (Johannesburg Suburb) 5.88 
West Rand (Johannesburg Suburb) 5.82 
Johannesburg (Gauteng) 4.38 
Cape Town (Western Cape) 4.38 
eThekwini (KwaZulu-Natal) 0.92 
Nelson Mandela (Eastern Cape) 0.63 
Tab. 3 Migration figures for selected South African municipalities, 2006. Data source: Stats SA; reproduced
from South African Cities Network 2006: 2.18; municipalities selected by South African Cities Network
to illustrate national trends; they are not necessarily representative of all South African cities.  /
Migration in ausgewählten städtischen Distrikten Südafrikas 2006. Datenquelle: Stats SA;
übernommen aus South African Cities Network 2006: 2.18
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Tab. 4 Presumed future place of residence of migrants in the inner city of Johannesburg (Source: Wits
University, 2006 African cities survey)  /  Vermuteter künftiger Wohnort von Migranten in der
Innenstadt von Johannesburg
Where respondent 
expects to live in 
two years 
Place of birth (%) 
DRC Somalia Mozambique 
South Africa outside 
Johannesburg 
South Africa 44 68 60 
81 
Country of origin 13 8 20 
Third country 30 11 4 5 
'RQ¶WNQRZ 13 12 15 13 
Total 100 100 100 100 
er urban centres are frequent returns to sending
areas for a variety of reasons discussed below.
Some of these trends are illustrated by ACMS
research: In the 2006 Wits University survey in
Johannesburg, 59 % of migrants considered Johan-
nesburg as their final destination. This proportion is
higher for Mozambicans (78 %) and for the inter-
nal migrants (84 %). In many regards, the migrants
born in Mozambique have the same migratory be-
haviour as the internal migrants in South Africa.
When the Mozambicans had considered other des-
tinations, it was essentially Swaziland or a Euro-
pean country. South Africans who migrated to Jo-
hannesburg also regularly considered other desti-
nations in South Africa, and many people had, in
fact, lived elsewhere before coming to Johannes-
burg. Table 4 captures some of these dynamics.
Linked to these trajectories and other factors,
people regularly move within South Africa as well
as into and out of it. According to the 2007 Com-
munity Survey, 18 % of Gauteng’s inhabitants had
moved within the Province since 2001. Accord-
ing to ACMS data for the inner city of Johannes-
burg, the South African born population has, on
average, moved twice since coming to the city. In
most instances that means moving twice within ten
years. For foreigners, who have typically lived in
the city for shorter periods, the average number
of moves is slightly above three times.
There is no easy way to summarise population
dynamics apart from saying that (a) we know
too little about them, and (b) there is no sin-
gle pattern of movement. As elsewhere in the
world, South African movements into and
through cities are driven by the desire for pas-
sage, profit and protection. These dynamics are
then shaped by the country’s relatively unique
socio-spatial history that has left populations
tightly clustered in economically unviable ‘ru-
ral’ locales and peri-urban townships. As the
following section suggests, the consequences
of these dynamics are being shaped (or at least
influenced) by current policy frameworks and
more or less ineffective responses from na-
tional and local authorities.
4. Policy Frameworks and Policy Responses1
Local government is one of three spheres of
government defined by the South African Con-
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stitution (the others being provincial and nation-
al). As currently conceived, South Africa is
somewhere between a centralised and a federal
state. While local government’s relatively inde-
pendent status is protected by the Constitution,
it is practically curtailed by financial and human
resource constraints and the domination of lo-
cal government by the highly centralised African
National Congress. Nonetheless, the Constitu-
tion provides clear definitions of municipalities’
roles and responsibilities including legislative
and executive authority over a number of matters.
By and large, municipalities are required to con-
centrate on areas such as: water and sanitation;
waste removal; fire fighting services; and munic-
ipal planning.  As such, many of the social and
economic concerns associated with movement
are not explicitly within local government’s man-
date. The primary needs of migrants – shelter,
access to health care, access to education, ac-
cess to economic opportunities – are largely the
responsibility of national or provincial govern-
ments. That said, under Section 153 (a) of the
Constitution, local municipalities have a respon-
sibility to, ‘structure and manage its administra-
tion and budgeting and planning processes to give
priority to the basic needs of the community, and
to promote the social and economic develop-
ment of the community’. Section 152 (1) further
defines this ‘developmental duty’ by saying that
local government has various objects or purpos-
es. These include ‘to promote social and eco-
nomic development’, ‘to promote a safe and
healthy environment’, and other responsibilities
that clearly suggest some responsibility towards
human mobility however ill-defined.
In response, most of South Africa’s municipal-
ities now accept that new arrivals are part of
their populations and that they will have to ad-
dress migration. Part of the shift in policy
comes from the slow recognition among some
officials in local government that without apart-
heid-style measures to control movements –
measures that for reasons of intention and in-
capacity never achieved 100 % effectiveness –
cities can do little to alter regional migration
dynamics (Kok and Collinson 2006; Johannes-
burg Strategic Development Strategy 2006).
However, this recognition comes with consider-
able trepidation and most municipalities (both
urban and rural) have thus far failed to develop
empirically informed and proactive policy re-
sponses to human mobility. Although there are
slow changes, many officials continue to react to
the presence of new arrivals by implicitly deny-
ing their presence, excluding them from develop-
mental plans, or allowing various forms of offi-
cial and non-official discrimination. Across South
Africa, international and domestic migrants con-
tinue to be seen largely as a drain on public re-
sources (see Bekker 2002) rather than as poten-
tial resources or, more neutrally, as the people
government is dedicated to serve. Even those wish-
ing to more proactively absorb new, often poor and
vulnerable populations, face considerable chal-
lenges in determining how to do so. I will speak
about these obstacles momentarily. Before doing
so, I wish to briefly outline a number of the po-
tential impacts of mobility as currently managed.
5. The Developmental Consequences
of Human Mobility
There is little systematic, nationally repre-
sentative data that outlines migration’s spa-
tialised developmental effects. However, a
review of data from the ACMS’ Johannes-
burg-based work points to a number of criti-
cal – and largely negative – effects that have
resulted from poor planning, lack of resourc-
es, and overt discrimination. These are most
evident in the area of housing (or human set-
tlements in the current official lexicon),
employment and access to social services.
The remainder of this section briefly outlines
some of the aforementioned challenges for the
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newly urbanised. (These data do not tell us the
effects of migration on sending communities.)
What we do know is that migrant labour in South
Africa continues to be a critical livelihood sup-
port for many South African households. In the
2006 Johannesburg survey, close to half
(47.9 %) of the South Africans interviewed re-
ported regularly sending money to someone
outside of Johannesburg, most commonly to
parents (60.7 %) or other close relatives. Of
those sending resources, 59.3 % say they send
on a monthly basis with another 22 % report-
ing sending money home three to four times a
year. The amount of resources sent from the
townships and peri-urban settlements is prob-
ably considerably less given that those living in
the inner city are relatively prosperous. Even
so, indications are that it remains a central live-
lihood strategy (Vearey et al. 2008). Indeed,
when families invest in sending someone to a
city for education or to look for a work, the
migrant is likely to remain a critical resource
for households in non-urban areas. While ru-
ral-to-urban transfers are not a primary source
of support as they are elsewhere on the conti-
nent, urban-to-urban transfers appear to be of
growing importance (Vearey et al. 2008).
The 2009 ACMS study in Johannesburg’s Al-
exandra Township and inner city identifies a
number of forms of vulnerability associated
with residents in those areas. All of these are-
as are primary destinations for people arriving
from outside the city although the types of peo-
ple who settle in the two areas are starkly dif-
ferent. Given the expense of housing in the in-
ner city, the migrants who end up there tend to
be from stronger educational backgrounds and
have some prior urban experience. The main
forms of vulnerability include risks of unem-
ployment, poor access to services and capital,
and insecurity due collective violence, crimi-
nality and harassment by state representatives.
These are experienced differently from one
area to another, as shown by significant differ-
ences between Alexandra and the inner city and
among different population groups (in this case
among the long term South African residents,
internal migrants and the foreign-born).
However, a number of critical factors affect pop-
ulations across nationality and locale. These in-
clude, inter alia, i) poor education and health
status that translates into low income earning
potential; ii) inadequate documentation that hin-
ders access to employment and services, iii) dis-
crimination and victimisation linked to place of
birth, iv) sex, with women being more vulnerable
than men, and v) place of residence: while mi-
grants in Alexandra are more exposed to risks of
unemployment and public violence, there is con-
siderable variation even within Alexandra.
There are at least three areas that warrant fur-
ther exploration: accomodation, employment
and access to essential social services.
5.1 Accommodation
Providing access to dignified and healthy hous-
ing is a key policy challenge for South Africa
in relation to all its residents. However, South
Africa’s housing policy has severely disadvan-
taged both non-citizens (who are comprehen-
sively excluded from subsidised housing pro-
grammes for low-income groups) and South
African migrants. Although there are mecha-
nisms such as the National Housing Subsidy
Scheme, the National Housing Programme for
the Upgrading of Informal Settlements, the Emer-
gency Housing Programme and subsidised rent-
al in council properties, these provisions have
proved patently unable to support recent arrivals
(see Greenburg and Polzer 2008).
Perhaps the greatest challenge to migrants ac-
cessing housing is the way in which the govern-
ment has conceptualised public housing provi-
sion. For a variety of reasons too complex to
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Tab. 5 Housing condition by place of living and migration history  (Source: author’s survey 2009)
Wohnverhältnisse nach Wohnort und Migrationshintergrund
describe here, South Africa settled on a public
housing model that, in most cases, intends to
provide free-standing housing to those falling
below certain income levels. The ownership of
a house is then transferred to the tenant so that
he/she can use it as an asset to secure a loan or
‘trade-up’ into a better housing situation. Such
an approach has fallen short for a number of rea-
sons. Although the government has (by its own
estimation) provided well over a million hous-
ing units in the past decade, these do not come
close to meeting the demand. Part of the problem
has been that these houses have been built on avail-
able land near people’s current residences. This
(a) excludes people who wish to leave economi-
cally unproductive areas and helps to reinforce
apartheid-era spatial divisions; and (b) means that
when new houses are built in urban areas, they are
often far from where people could potentially
work. Indeed, as a fixed asset they do not allow
the kind of flexibility often required for people
who change jobs frequently. Moreover, while peo-
ple technically own the property, there is a for-
mal prohibition on selling it for five years after it
has been received. As such, the government has
effectively killed the entry-level housing market
and disabled the poor’s ability to ‘trade-up’.
Beyond the technicalities described above, the
types of housing provided are ill-suited to a
newly urbanised population. In most instanc-
es they are available only to married couples
or to single people (usually women) with chil-
dren. Given that many of the migrants reach-
 
Lives in a multi-
family apartment, 
a backyard, 
a GRPHVWLFZRUNHU¶V
quarter, a hostel, 
a self-built house, 
a shelter (%) 
Access to 
electricity 
in the 
current 
dwelling 
(%) 
Access to 
water 
inside the 
current 
dwelling 
(%) 
Place of 
living and 
migration 
history 
Alexandra 
Long-term residents 80  71  14 
Internal migrants  83  65  14 
Foreign-born 91  45   7 
Johannesburg 
inner-city 
Long-term resident 30  96  93 
Internal migrants  37  97  96 
Foreign-born 55  98  97 
Country of birth 
South Africa 63  80  46 
Zimbabwe 66  89  75 
Mozambique 89  36  13 
DRC 44 100  100 
Malawi 66  73  71 
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ing cities are neither married nor actively car-
ing for children, they have been essentially
excluded from this benefit. Moreover, as
many of the newly urbanised do not see the
city as a final destination, the last thing they
want is to invest their resources in a perma-
nent home. However, given the stigma asso-
ciated with ‘hostels’ (large structures intend-
ed to occupy migrant labour), the government
has been reluctant to consider large-scale tem-
porary or transitional housing options.
Due to these exclusions and a general shortage
of public housing, ACMS research in urban ar-
eas suggests that 70 % of urban migrants live
in privately rented inner-city flats, of which
36 % are main tenants and 64 % are in sub-
tenancy arrangements (Greenburg and Polzer
2008; also Peberdy and Majodina 2000).
Housing insecurity is most strikingly illustrat-
ed by migrants’ experience of overcrowding
through sub-tenancy. Of survey respondents,
40 % stated this as their main housing concern.
Overcrowding impacts negatively on both
physical and mental health, on the ability to
build a sustainable livelihood, and on child de-
velopment. Since overcrowding also contrib-
utes to the degeneration of buildings and urban
infrastructure, it is in the interest of metropol-
itan councils to reduce housing insecurity.
Using data collected during the ACMS 2009
survey, Table 5 provides a breakdown of the
type of housing where people live. It is also im-
portant to keep in mind that South African cit-
ies rarely provide a housing ‘ladder’. Such a lad-
der would offer accommodation at various
prices in various places in ways that would al-
low people to climb towards ownership should
they so desire. As such, even those who are able
to establish a toe-hold in the city can rarely
trade up. Without well-paid and regular jobs, it
is almost impossible to get the housing credit
needed to span the significant price gap be-
tween an entry- level or government-provided
dwelling and a fully serviced house or flat.
5.2  Labour market
Ready access to informal and formal markets
for exchanging goods and services is critical to
successful urban economies. Unfortunately,
migrants who have recently arrived in South Af-
rican cities are often systematically excluded
from employment and income-generating op-
portunities through both formal and informal
mechanisms. Foreign citizens without the right
to work – but with the skills and a willingness
to do so – often accept positions where they are
paid below the minimum wage or work in undig-
nified conditions. Even those with employment
rights report being turned away by employers
who do not recognise their papers or their pro-
fessional qualifications. Without money to have
their qualifications recognised by the South
African Qualifications Agency (SAQA), they
have little choice but to seek other ways to gen-
erate income. A recent court decision now al-
lows undocumented migrants to seek recourse
for labour abuses through the Labour Court and
other arbitration mechanisms. However, it is
unclear whether this will have any substantive
impact on improving labour conditions.
Despite the obstacles facing international mi-
grants, South African migrants often face much
greater obstacles in finding employment. Those
coming from poor rural areas are particularly
ill-equipped to participate in the urban labour
market. Consequently, new arrivals tend to be
among the poorest and least employed. While
they may be able to rely on social grants or other
forms of social protection, they often struggle
to earn the income needed to move out of ab-
ject poverty (see Cross et al. 2005). They also
face a series of obstacles related to informal
trading that effectively blocks people trying to
enter in the lower end of the business sector.
These include by-laws that require business li-
censes or prohibit the kind of trades available
to the poor. Although poorly understood, there
also appear to be severe social sanctions on
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newcomers establishing businesses in town-
ships or peri-urban settlements. With signifi-
cant numbers of South Africans likely to re-
main ‘structurally unemployed’ – unlikely to
find formal jobs in their lifetimes – having lit-
tle access to these sort of small business op-
tions can be economically devastating.
5.3 Social services
A cocktail of undercapacity, inadequate docu-
mentation, poor record keeping and outright
discrimination prevents many migrants – non-
nationals and South Africans – from accessing
critical social services. This is most visible in
terms of accessing health care. The inability or
unwillingness of many hospital staff members
to distinguish between different classes of mi-
grants (coupled with xenophobia) often means
that migrants, including refugees, are denied ac-
cess to basic and emergency health services or
are charged inappropriate fees. Many non-
nationals report not being able to access Anti-
Retroviral Treatment, for example, because they
do not have green, bar-coded ID documents. Non-
nationals may not only be refused services out-
right, but foreigners report being made to wait
longer than South Africans before being seen and
are subject to other forms of discrimination.
There are also accounts indicating that non-nation-
als are often denied full courses of prescribed
medicines (see Nkosi 2004; Pursell 2005).
While one might expect foreigners to face dif-
ficulty in accessing health care, there are also
significant challenges for newly urbanised South
Africans. Many people’s struggles to access ad-
equate care in rural or sending areas are repli-
cated in urban centres. While urban residents are
often better to access emergency care, regular,
primary care – including HIV testing and anti-
retroviral therapy – remains elusive. Some small
part of this has to do with individuals’ health-
seeking behaviour: People from rural areas may
mistrust the kind of ‘western’ medicine availa-
ble in the cities. As Vearey et al. (2008) dem-
onstrate, there are also other significant prob-
lems with the availability of health services and
medicines in the informal settlements and com-
munities that absorb new migrants. If people are
working, they may simply not have the time to
travel to more distant clinics. Although the South
African Government is working to improve its
record systems, many urban migrants must still
return to their ‘home’ clinics because that is where
their records are kept. Even if it were possible to
move records to an urban clinic, many migrants’
transience necessitates a system that allows peo-
ple to access health care at multiple points.
6.  Challenges in Addressing
Migration and Urbanisation
Recognising the importance of human mobility
to human and economic development does not
necessarily mean that officials have the informa-
tion or tools to do this effectively. Perhaps the
most fundamental challenge to local govern-
ments charged with addressing migration and
other development challenges is how little lo-
cal officials know about the people living in
their communities. Whereas national govern-
ments have the relative luxury of developing
generalised policy frameworks, local govern-
ments and service providers are responsible for
more focused and context-specific interven-
tions. In almost no instances are municipalities
able to draw on a nuanced and dynamic under-
standing of their constituencies. This is gener-
ally true regarding the urban poor and all the
more so with geographically mobile people.
Efforts to map ‘poverty pockets’ (Cross et al.
2005) and review both national and localised
migration data (Dorrington 2005, Bekker 2002,
Kok and Collinson 2006, South African Cities
Network 2006, Landau and Gindrey 2008) re-
present some of the first concerted effort to un-
derstand South Africa’s urban population dynam-
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ics. However, many of these studies are based
on admittedly incomplete census data – partic-
ularly inaccurate regarding foreign-born pop-
ulations – and are often purely descriptive.
While the Department of Cooperative Govern-
ment and Traditional Authorities (effectively
the Ministry of Local Government) now rec-
ognises that there is a need for improving
cross-border and multi-nodal planning – in-
cluding a greater consideration of population
mobility – planners are effectively unable to
understand the ‘functional economic geogra-
phy of the city and its region [and] how the dif-
ferent components relate to each other’
(South African Cities Network 2006: Section
2-7). In this context, local planners continue
to be influenced by stereotypes and misread-
ing or incomplete readings of data.
The inability to effectively understand and pre-
dict urban populations poses significant risks to
local governments’ ability to meet their obliga-
tions and developmental objectives. Perhaps
most obviously, the invisibility of large seg-
ments of the urban population can result in much
greater demand for services than predicted, re-
ducing service quality and outstripping budget-
ary allocations. In many instances, these are hid-
den costs – to public and private infrastructure,
water, and other services that are not accessed
individually. Higher populations do not, howev-
er, necessarily result in higher costs to local
government in receiving areas. Because many of
South Africa’s internal migrants are young men,
they may remain relatively healthy, autonomous
and productive in urban areas – and hence levy
few costs. Moreover, while they may not invest
in property, much of their consumption  – of
food and consumer goods – is in urban areas. In
such instances, sending communities may lose the
benefits of their labour while being saddled with
the costs of educating their children and provid-
ing for them in their old age. Many of these costs
are paid centrally or via the provinces, but others
are the responsibility of local government.
While both sending and receiving communities
are influenced by the significant costs and bene-
fits associated with migration, population
dynamics rarely figure in the distribution of
national resources by the South African
Treasury. Since the promulgation of the new
constitution in 1996, the Treasury has distribut-
ed money to the provinces (and subsequently to
the metros) based almost exclusively on current
population estimates. Such practices are prob-
lematic for at least three reasons. First, the popu-
lation estimates often significantly misrepresent
where people actually live. Someone may own a
house and vote in a rural community but live else-
where for eleven months of the year (Department
of Housing 2006). Second, people’s presence in
a particular locality is not necessarily a good
predictor of their costs to local or provincial
government. Third, infrastructure and social serv-
ice planning requires long-term investments
based on predictions of population in five to fif-
teen years time. Without reliable estimates, cit-
ies are unable to prepare for their population’s
future needs. In late September 2006, the South
African Fiscal Commission convened a seminar
to try to come to grips with these issues in order
to better advise the treasury on resource distri-
bution. In 2008, the Treasury again met – with
World Bank support – to discuss resource allo-
cation. However, planning continues to be based
on current rather than projected population dis-
tributions and all but ignores undocumented mi-
grants. Perhaps most worrying is that many plan-
ners remain unaware of such an approach’s frailty
in a country with such high rates of mobility. This
is likely to become particularly problematic as
South Africa begins implementing its national
spatial development framework.
The lack of coordination among govern-
ment departments and agencies further ex-
aggerates the partial and often ill-informed
responses to human mobility. In discussions
with planners, they repeatedly expressed frus-
tration regarding their efforts to foster collab-
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oration within local government departments
and, more importantly, between local govern-
ment and South Africa’s other two governmen-
tal ‘spheres’ (provincial and national). How-
ever, due to migration’s spatial dynamics, ef-
fectively responding to human mobility is not
something that any single governmental body
or sphere can singly address as it requires co-
ordination and planning that transcends the
boundaries of metropolitan areas and encom-
passes a wider area connected by commuter
flows, economic linkages and shared facilities.
The paucity of collaboration is visible in a variety
of potentially critical areas. Perhaps most obvi-
ously, the Department of Home Affairs (DHA –
responsible for immigration and domestic pop-
ulation registries) has been either reluctant or
unable to share its data with city planners. These
not only include the number of foreigners le-
gally entering the country, but registered moves,
deaths and births. The most probable cause is
lack of capacity within the DHA, although there
is undoubtedly also a general reluctance to
freely share information. It is, of course, not
only the DHA that has shown a reluctance to
work with local government, but the lack of
coordination between DHA and local govern-
ment is probably the most significant gap.
We must also recognise that were city planners
keen to promote the benefits of migration and
had the knowledge and support to do so, they
are still left with a population that may not
identify with the cities in which they live.
As suggested earlier, many who come to the
city do not expect to stay there for long. Ac-
cording to Statistics South Africa, “the tempo-
rary nature of rural-to-urban migration in South
Africa may add insight into the persistence of
overcrowding and poor living conditions in ur-
ban townships. Migrants may employ a calcu-
lated strategy to maximise the benefits to their
household of origin, rather than for their own
benefit or the benefit of residential units in the
urban setting” (in Johannesburg Development
Strategy 2006: 28). Critically, journeys home
or onwards often remain practically elusive for
reasons of money, safety or social status. This
leaves large sections of the population work-
ing in the city, but not wishing to take root or
invest in it. We also see evidence of this extra-
local orientation in the levels of remittances
being sent out of the city to both rural commu-
nities and other countries.
Although it is almost impossible to quantify the
consequences of a city filled with those who
identify with sites elsewhere, hints appear in the
type of social and material investments people
are willing to make in the city, including the
type of housing or services for which they are
willing to pay. It also raises important govern-
ance challenges: If people do not see their fu-
ture in their existing neighbourhood or urban
community, they are less likely to become po-
litically engaged or to voice their opinions
about what must be done. Without this feed-
back, government planning is unlikely to succeed.
The cities’ fragmentation and fluidity also raise
concerns around the kind of social capital need-
ed to promote small business, offer a social safety
net and combat crime and violence.
In considering the challenges facing local gov-
ernment and the possibility for positive policy
reform, we must note that the current policy
climate is not conducive to developing pro-
migrant responses. As suggested elsewhere,
the South African Department of Home Affairs
has shown little ability in developing and imple-
menting a sound and effective immigration pol-
icy. Elsewhere in government, there has been
little planning or consideration of human mobil-
ity and there appears to be a growing sense that
migration remains a social dysfunction that
should be countered wherever possible. The cur-
rent administration’s pro-rural agenda appears to
be as much about providing basic services for the
poor – and maintaining a rural political constit-
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uency – as about halting movement to the coun-
try’s towns and cities. As such, there is little
reason to believe that South Africa will inde-
pendently shift its approach to one that accepts
human mobility as a natural and potentially pro-
ductive part of the development process.
Lastly, we must recognise that public policy
and government interventions are often only
loosely connected with substantive change
in citizens’ lives. As a result of their history of
struggle and resistance, South African cities are
effectively governed by a blend of informal and
formal authority structures often linked to po-
litical parties or other more localised political
entities. Activated at different levels at differ-
ent times, these structures determine – albeit in-
consistently – the right to live in the city, the po-
tential success of formal institutional reform
and the economic and physical security of those
living in a cluster of shacks or a given street. This
system of heterogeneous rule is enabled by the
lack of trusted, legitimate central leadership. In
its absence, self-appointed structures almost
completely appropriated the authority constitution-
ally mandated to local government structures, op-
erating as an ‘untouchable’ parallel leadership in col-
laboration with the police and elected leaders or
against them (see Misago et al. 2009; Landau and
Monson 2008; Palmary et al. 2003).
In many instances, community leadership is an
attractive alternative for the largely unem-
ployed residents of the informal settlements.
It is a form of paid employment or an income-
generating activity where supposedly voluntary
leaders often charge for services, levy protec-
tion fees, sell or let land and buildings and take
bribes in exchange for solving problems or in-
fluencing tender processes. The profitability of
community leadership positions has attracted
considerable infighting and competition for
power and legitimacy among different groups
present in affected areas. Indeed, street com-
mittees, Community Policing Forums (CPFs)
and South African National Civics Organisation
(SANCO) in most areas report involvement in
solving all sorts of problems community mem-
bers bring to them. For example, in Madela-
kufa II (a part of Alexandra Township in Johan-
nesburg) respondents report that the CPF,
whose mandate is – according to the local CPF
leaders – ‘exclusively fighting crime’, also in-
volves itself in solving socio-economic and
service delivery issues. In Du Noon, in the
Western Cape, the local SANCO, which the oth-
er local leaders call a ‘family business’, con-
stantly battles the ward council when negotiat-
ing development projects with donors. Any re-
form initiative, whatever the goal, must negoti-
ate the varied and often difficult terrain.
7. Recommendation for
Reform and Support
There is little definite or conclusive to say about
migration and development in South Africa oth-
er than that the dynamics are complex, highly
spatialised and prone to rapid shifts in both na-
ture and effects. In such a context, a document
like this can only raise issues that will – or
should – shape population and political dynam-
ics and responses to them. To that end, there is
a need to rethink three divisions: between doc-
umented and undocumented migrants; between
voluntary and forced migrants; and between in-
ternational and domestic migration. This has
tended to produce policy silos with little coor-
dination among agencies charged with law en-
forcement, status determination, documenta-
tion, social assistance or local development. In
almost no instances do such firm distinctions
make logical sense. This is all the more so in
South Africa where there are mixed migration
flows and few bureaucratic mechanisms to dis-
tinguish among the various migrant categories.
If there is to be substantive and effective reform
in any one of these areas – asylum, migration,
border management or urban development – all
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must be considered together as part of a nation-
al framework to address human mobility. As
Swaziland, Lesotho and parts of Zimbabwe are
effectively part of South Africa as far as mi-
grant systems are concerns, these discussions
must explicitly consider regional dimensions.
There is also a need to introduce a spatial com-
ponent in considering future policy directions.
Perhaps more than many policy areas, national
governments are automatically assigned com-
prehensive responsibility for matters affecting
immigration, emigration and broader urban and
rural development frameworks. While nation-
al government has an important role, there is a
need to enhance the role of local authorities in
such planning initiatives. As migration’s most
immediate effects are felt locally in both send-
ing and receiving communities, municipalities
must be involved to ensure that these effects
are developmentally positive. Moreover, be-
cause migration involves at least two distinct
geographic locales, the developmental effects
are, by definition, multi-sited. As such, both
analysis and policy debates must work towards
a multi-sited approach. Any discussion of migra-
tion and development should hereafter consider
local, sub-national, national and – indeed –
regional impacts and policy options.
There will also be benefits from situating glo-
bal debates over migration within broader dis-
cussions over governance and development. If
nothing else, this report suggests that foreign
assistance and domestic policy reforms push
for ‘migration mainstreaming’ into all aspects
of governance. In a country where internation-
al and domestic mobility remains so demo-
graphically and politically important, the suc-
cess of any development initiative must overt-
ly consider the country’s population dynamics.
As part of this process, the government should
identify and understand the root causes of the
negative by-products of human mobility – cor-
ruption, human rights abuses, labour competi-
tion – and begin developing ways to help reduce
them rather than rely on the fantasy that it
should and can totally control mobility itself.
In terms of more concrete and immediate inter-
ventions, donor and local support could useful-
ly be dedicated to the following concerns:
 y Finding ways of building a ‘housing
ladder’ and housing types that are appro-
priate to mobile populations: This will en-
able housing policy to serve as a gateway to
the city – allowing those who wish to transit
to do so without extraordinary investment and
to allow those who wish to stay to gradually
improve their housing situation.
 y Shifting time frames for service delivery
analysis and planning. Local authorities
are often under pressure to provide
quick fixes to their population’s acute
needs: While such needs cannot be ignored,
such an approach all but guarantees (a) that
the needs of future residents will not be
considered or planned for; and (b) that lo-
cal authorities will continue to feel threat-
ened by the continued arrival and transit of
people through their communities.
 y Facilitate debates around the nature of cit-
izenship, social investment and participa-
tory politics in areas with mobile or tran-
sient populations: Current community en-
gagement tools often exclude those who are
new arrivals or do not see their futures tied to
the city. This can only result in poor planning
and social fragmentation. Addressing this
means rethinking modes of engaging with such
populations and to promote local commitments
without undermining their aspirations for on-
ward (or return) movement and responsibilities
to support those living elsewhere.
 y Develop service delivery mechanisms that
consider mobile populations: The inabili-
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ty of people to access health care records in
multiple sites is a fundamental obstacle to
accessing health care. Similarly, accessing
education, housing, and other services and
grants is often difficult for those who move.
A review of how records are managed could
help address these concerns.
 y Reconsider budgeting and planning
frameworks: To encourage planning for
mobile population, both sending and receiv-
ing communities need to be supported in
seeking to address the needs of migrants
and their families. This will require (a) al-
locating resources in ways that consider
population trajectories and (b) developing
mechanism that can coordinate services in
areas where people commute or move
across municipal boundaries.
 y Incorporate smaller towns and sending
communities in discussions around mo-
bility and development: To date, the coun-
try’s largest communities have begun recog-
nising that mobility is affecting their devel-
opment trajectories. However, these are not
the only communities affected by migration.
As such, any approach to understanding mi-
gration and local governance must also con-
sider peri-urban and small towns.
Lastly, any effort to incorporate migration into
a long-term policy and governance process will
require better data and integration of data into
planning processes. Enhanced data collection
must not only focus on the number of peo-
ple moving, but on people’s aspirations and
the formal and informal obstacles they face,
resources they have available and strategies
they adopt. This will become particularly im-
portant as South Africa actively implements its
spatial development model. While it is useful
to develop aggregated trends, reactions and at-
titudes may be shaped by the particular racial,
economic and political history of a single
neighbourhood. All this will require heighten-
ing capacity for statistical, institutional and so-
cial analyses. While this is critical at the nation-
al level, all spheres of government should be en-
couraged to collaborate and develop the capac-
ity for data collection and analysis at all levels.
Lastly, mechanisms should be created to ensure
that these analyses – if they eventually become
available – are fed into decision-making proc-
esses. Doing otherwise will ensure policy fail-
ure and may help realise many planners’ current
fears about the effects of human mobility on
prosperity, security and development.
Note
1 The introductory paragraphs of this section draw
heavily from Götz and Landau 2004 and Götz 2004.
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Summary: Changing Local Government Responses
to Migration in South Africa
Constitutionally empowered to be a leading force for
development, provincial and municipal authorities have
been wary of addressing population movements or
seeing them as fundamentally tied to socio-economic
development. In many instances, authorities fear that
developing pro-active, positive responses to migration
would only encourage more of it. Whatever the
reason, budgeting and planning exercises make little
reference to extended population projections or other
insights into the relationships among mobility, liveli-
hoods and community development. As the population
continues to move, the shortcomings of these planning
exercises and interventions have become increasing-
ly evident in terms of limited access to critical servic-
es, physical and economic insecurity, marginalisation
and social conflict. After reviewing migration dynam-
ics and challenges in South Africa, this short essay
makes five recommendations for improving migration
policy and management:  1) Reconsider the analytic
and bureaucratic divisions between documented and
undocumented migrants; between voluntary and
forced migrants; and between international and do-
mestic migration;  2) Analytically respatialise plan-
ning and management scenarios. While recognising
national government’s important role, there is a need
to enhance the role of local governments – working
together and with districts, provinces, and national
bodies – in evaluating, designing and implementing an
approach to human mobility;  3) Situate migration and
its management within global debates over govern-
ance and development. As of yet, few international
actors (let alone the South African government), have
applied lessons learned from broader governance
approaches to migration. Such an approach would
include ‘migration mainstreaming’ into all aspects of
governance;  4) Fundamentally reconsider how re-
sources are allocated to municipalities as local author-
ities often lack the resources needed for populations
that are likely to arrive in the future or for those
temporarily residing within their municipalities. More-
over, current budgeting models rarely support translo-
cal coordination in support of populations who move
across municipal or provincial boundaries;  5) Incorpo-
rating migration into long-term policy and governance
systems will require better data and integration of data
into planning processes. Without the ability to describe
human mobility and evaluate policies’ current and po-
tential impacts, interventions may fail in ways that
realise planners’ current fears about human mobility’s
effects on prosperity, security and development.
Zusammenfassung: Veränderte Reaktionen von
Kommunalverwaltungen auf Migration in Südafrika
Obwohl verfassungsgemäß als wesentliche Akteure
für regionale Entwicklung bestimmt, haben die Pro-
vinz- und Kommunalbehörden Bevölkerungswande-
rungen bisher nur zurückhaltend thematisiert und
kaum in Verbindung zur sozioökonomischen Ent-
wicklung gebracht. In vielen Fällen fürchten die
Behörden, dass ein positiver, proaktiver Umgang mit
Migration diese nur fördert. Aus welchem Grund
auch immer beziehen sich Haushalts- und Planungs-
überlegungen wenig auf ausführlichere Bevölkerungs-
prognosen oder andere Erkenntnisse über die Zusam-
menhänge zwischen Mobilität, Lebensunterhalts-
sicherung und kommunaler Entwicklung. Während
Migrationsprozesse andauern, werden die Mängel
dieser Planungen und Maßnahmen immer deutlicher,
in Form von begrenztem Zugang zu wichtigen Dienst-
leistungen, physischer und ökonomischer Unsicher-
heit, Marginalisierung sowie sozialen Konflikten. Nach
der Darstellung der Migrationsdynamik in Südafrika
und der sich aus ihr ergebenden Herausforderungen
macht dieser Beitrag fünf Empfehlungen für Verbes-
serungen bei Migrationspolitik und -praxis: 1) eine
Neubewertung der analytischen und verwaltungsmä-
ßigen Trennung zwischen Migranten mit und ohne
Dokumenten, zwischen freiwilligen und Zwangsmig-
ranten; und zwischen internationaler und Binnenmig-
ration; 2) die teilräumliche Umsetzung von Planungs-
und Management-Szenarios. Während die Bedeu-
tung der nationalen Regierung weitgehend anerkannt
wird, sollte auch die lokale Verwaltungsebene – in
Zusammenarbeit, auch mit Distrikten, Provinzen und
nationalen Instanzen – stärker in die Bewertung,
Gestaltung und Implementierung des Umgangs mit
der Mobilität der Menschen einbezogen werden;
3) eine Berücksichtigung von Migration und Migrati-
onsmanagement in globalen Debatten über Steue-
rung und Entwicklung. Bis heute haben nur wenige
internationale Akteure (und die südafrikanische Re-
gierung überhaupt nicht) Erkenntnisse aus der allge-
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meinen Governance-Diskussion auf Migration ange-
wandt. Ein solcher Ansatz würde „Migrations-Main-
streaming“ in alle Aspekte der Governance einbin-
den; 4) ein Überdenken der Ressourcenverteilung an
die Kommunen, da lokalen Behörden oft die Res-
sourcen fehlen, die für künftig erwartete Zuwande-
rer oder für zeitweilig anwesende Wohnbevölkerung
gebraucht werden. Außerdem fördern gegenwärtig
angewandte Haushaltsmodelle selten eine überörtli-
che Koordinierung der Unterstützung von Zuwande-
rern, die sich über kommunale bzw. provinziale Gren-
zen hinweg bewegen; 5) die Einbeziehung von Migra-
tion in langfristige Politik und Governance-Prozesse;
diese erfordert bessere Daten und die bessere Inte-
gration von Daten in Planungsprozesse. Ohne die
Möglichkeit, die Mobilität der Menschen zu beschrei-
ben und die aktuellen und potentiellen Auswirkungen
der Migrationspolitik zu bewerten, können Interventi-
onen in einer Weise scheitern, die die Ängste von
Planern in Bezug auf die Effekte von Mobilität auf
Wohlstand, Sicherheit und Entwicklung bestätigen.
Des réactions changées des gouvernements lo-
caux à la migration en Afrique du Sud
Bien que constitutionnellement habilitées à jouer un
rôle moteur pour le développement, les autorités
provinciales et municipales hésitent à prendre en
considération les mouvements de population ou à les
envisager sous l’angle du développement socio-éco-
nomique. Dans de nombreux cas, les autorités crai-
gnent qu’une politique migratoire proactive ne fasse
qu’encourager davantage de migration. Quelles que
soient les raisons, les exercices budgétaires et de
planification n’intègrent guère les projections relati-
ves à l’accroissement de la population ou d’autres
aspects des relations entre la mobilité, les moyens de
subsistance et le développement communautaire.
Alors que la population continue à se déplacer, les
lacunes de ces exercices de planification deviennent
de plus en plus évidentes et se traduisent par  un
accès limité aux services essentiels, une insécurité
physique et économique, une marginalisation et des
conflits sociaux. Après avoir examiné les dynami-
ques migratoires et les défis de l’Afrique du Sud, ce
court essai émet cinq recommandations pour amélio-
rer la politique et la gestion des migrations:  1) Revoir
les divisions analytiques et bureaucratiques entre les
migrants avec ou sans papiers; entre les migrants
volontaires ou forcés, et entre la migration internatio-
nale et nationale;  2) réorganiser la spatialisation des
scénarios de planification et de gestion sur une base
analytique. Tout en reconnaissant le rôle important
du gouvernement national, il est nécessaire de ren-
forcer le rôle des gouvernements locaux, de tra-
vailler en collaboration avec les districts, les provin-
ces et les organismes nationaux dans l’évaluation, la
conception et la mise en œuvre d’une approche de la
mobilité humaine.  3 ) Intégrer la migration et sa
gestion dans une réflexion globale sur la gouvernan-
ce et le développement. Pour l’instant, peu d’acteurs
internationaux (et encore moins le gouvernement
sud-africain), ont appliqué les leçons tirées des ap-
proches plus larges de gouvernance de la migration.
Leur application devrait inclure la  « migration mains-
treaming » dans tous les aspects de la gouvernance;
4) reconsidérer fondamentalement la façon dont les
ressources sont allouées aux municipalités alors que
les autorités locales n’ont souvent pas les ressources
nécessaires pour gérer les populations qui sont sus-
ceptibles d’arriver dans le futur ou celles qui résident
temporairement dans leurs municipalités. En outre,
les modèles budgétaires actuels permettent rare-
ment d’assurer la coordination translocale nécessaire
à l’assistance des populations qui se déplacent à
travers les limites municipales ou provinciales;
5)  la prise en compte à long terme de la migration au
sein des politiques et des systèmes de gouvernance
nécessitera l’amélioration des données et de leur
intégration dans les processus de planification. Sans
capacité de décrire la mobilité humaine et d’évaluer
l’impact actuel et potentiel des politiques, les inter-
ventions pourraient échouer, matérialisant alors les
craintes actuelles des planificateurs concernant les
effets de la mobilité humaine sur la prospérité, la
sécurité et le développement.
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